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CHARITABLE GIVING AND THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES
By CLINTON J. NAJARIAN*

Charitable giving in recent times has become increasingly widespread and important. Tax advantages,' growing social concern
for the viability of charitable institutions and services, and some
measure of personal vanity all combine to encourage philanthropy.
When private bequests are made to a charity, the makdr should be
informed that many such testamentary dispositions have encountered difficulties in the area of future interests, either because of
the Rule Against Perpetuities or problems regarding accumulations. It is true that in future interests cases courts reiterate that
charities are favored by the law. 2 It is necessary, however, to
ascertain precisely how far their favoritism will carry courts when
they are determining the validity of a charitable gift. If it is found
that the courts have not embraced a sufficiently liberal approach,
the question arises as to how the favored status of charities can
be advanced and charitable giving encouraged, either by the courts
or by statute, without violating the purposes of the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
In future interests law there are two instances where charities
are favored: (1) there is no limit to the duration of charitable
trusts, which may last perpetually and (2) a future interest for a
charitable purpose is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities
if preceded by a present interest for a charitable purpose. If, however, either the present interest or the future interest is not limited
* B.A., Yale University, 1958; LL.B., Yale Law School, 1961; associate,
Rhoda, Stoudt & Bradley, Reading, Pennsylvania; Assistant City Solicitor,
City of Reading (1964); member, Berks County and Pennsylvania
Bar Associations.
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170 (income tax), § 2055 (estate tax),
§ 2522 (gift tax). It should be noted, however, that because income tax
advantages have induced large corporate gifts and also the establishment
of charitable foundations, private gifts have become somewhat less vital.
2. E.g., Duggan v. Slocum, 92 Fed. 806, 808 (2d Cir. 1899), ("Charities

are favored; the ,'stern rule against perpetuities is relaxed for their benefit.'"); Hagen v. Sacrison, 198 N.D. 160, 173, 123 N.W. 518, 522 (1909),
(" 'Charitable trusts are highly favored, and a liberal construction will be
adopted in order to render them effectual.' "); see LEAcH &
§ 24.36 (1957).

RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
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to a charity, or if the gift is to a charity subject to a condition precedent, the Rule Against Perpetuities applies with full force.
PERPETUAL CHARITABLE TRUSTS

When a gift is made in trust for a charitable purpose, there is
ordinarily no definite beneficiary. The equitable interest in the
trust is inalienable.3 Charitable trusts, therefore, can be described
as perpetuities in the sense that a perpetuity is an "inalienable,
indestructible interest, ''4 but not in the sense of a perpetuity resulting from remoteness of resting. Although a private trust may
not exist in perpetuity, 5 a present charitable trust is valid even if
it may continue indefinitely or perpetually.6 It is uniformly settled that property given to a charity may become perpetually in-7
alienable provided that the gift has vested or is certain to vest
within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 8
Two policy arguments have been directed against validating
the perpetual charitable trust. First, it is often said that the living generation should control its property and that the dead should
not dictate from the grave. Second, the contention is made that
these trusts violate the policy against taking property out of com3. This is because there is no specific person who can convey the
interest. If the gift were made outright to a charitable corporation, the
property would be alienable. SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1279 (2d ed. 1956).
4. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 590 (4th ed. 1942).
5. Charitable trusts may, and usually do, last forever. It is, however, impossible to create a perpetual private trust, because income rights under such a trust will terminate with the death of
the income beneficiary and because the rule against perpetuities
will invalidate attempts to create rights to income that may vest
too remotely.
GULLIVER, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS 82 (1959).
6. Art Students' League v. Hinkley, 31 F.2d 469 (D. Md. 1929); Mitchell v. Reeves, 123 Conn. 549, 196 Atl. 785 (1938); Abend v. Endowment Fund
Comm'rs, 174 Ill. 96, 50 N.E. 1052 (1898); Alden v. St. Peter's Parish, 158
Ill. 631, 42 N.E. 392 (1895); Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 134 N.E. 276
(1922); Frazier v. Merchants Nat'l Bank of Salem, 296 Mass. 298, 5 N.E.2d
550 (1936); Dexter v. Gardner, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 243 (1863); Smart v.
Durham, 77 N.H. 56, 86 Atl. 821 (1913); Hilliard v. Parker, 76 N.J. Eq. 447,
74 Atl. 447 (Ch. 1909); Powers v. First Nat'l Bank of Corsicana, 138 Tex.
604, 161 S.W.2d 273 (1942); Stainer v. Burton, 17 Utah 331, 53 Pac. 1015
(1898); Mercantile Banking & Trust Co. v. Shawacre, 102 W.Va. 260, 135
S.E. 9 (1926); Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 28 N.W. 353 (1886). See generally RESTATEMENTS, TRUSTS § 376 (1935); 4 RESTATEMENT, PROP. § 398
(1944); SCOTT, TRUSTS § 365 (2d ed. 1956).
An annuity may be given to a charitable corporation perpetually. Merrill v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 73 N.H. 414, 62 Atl. 647 (1905).
7. Although there is no definite beneficiary in which the interest
may vest, the charitable purpose supposedly fills this need. "While it may
be pure fiction to say that the equitable interest is vested in a charitable
purpose, that analysis has never been questioned." SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY
AND THE DEAD HAND 113 (1955).
8. Delaware Land & Development Co. v. First & Central Presbyterian
Church, 16 Del. Ch. 410, 147 Atl. 165 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
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merce.
As to the first, Professor Simes vigorously points to many cases
in which testators' narrow and eccentric purposes have been accepted by the courts as charitable. He also maintains that many
originally valid charitable purposes tend to become obsolescent over
the years.' 0
In considering the second argument, it must be admitted that a
specific thing donated to a charitable use, e.g., a building to be
used as a school or a hospital, may be taken out of commerce."
If the property is held in trust, however, the trustee normally can
sell it. 1 2 Furthermore, most bequests to charitable trusts today are
in the form of securities, readily salable by the trustee if he chooses
to reinvest the trust estate. Therefore, specific assets, as distinguished from the total aggregate of wealth, are not necessarily tied
up in a charitable purpose.
In spite of the objections, perpetual trusts for charity are valid.
The objections are outweighed by a strong policy in favor of charity.
Society gains if property is removed from commerce to benefit the
public. The dead hand may control, but only if it is willing to
devote its estate to the common welfare.
Professor Simes has analyzed the doctrine of cy pres as a remedy to the asserted evils of the perpetual trust for charity, 13 but
has found it inadequate. He has proposed, instead, the following
remedies:
1) After the expiration of a fixed period of time, say 30
years, or earlier with the approval of the trustees and
of the donor, if living, a broadened cy pres doctrine
should be applicable.
2) r would vest in the trustees of every charitable trust,
after it has existed for a fixed period of time, say thirty
years,14 the power to consume the principal of the
trust.
Nonetheless, a strong case can be made to buttress the courts'
leniency toward indefinitely long charitable trusts. Countless
funds have been donated for philanthropic purposes in this manner,
with many institutions successfully fulfilling needs of the public.
Such charities as universities are dependent on the continuous duration of endowments given for such charitable purposes as professorships, scholarships, and numerous other benefits.
9. SIMES, op. cit. supra note 7, at 118-21.
10. Id. at 121-124. "Not only may changing circumstances affect the

utility of the trust purpose, but they may also distort the size or purchasing
power of the trust income." Id. at 123.
11. Furthermore, it is usually not income-producing property.
12. The power to sell is usually given the trustee in the trust instrument. If not, he may get that power by statute in some states or by court
decree.

GULLIVER,

CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTs

13. SIMEs, op. cit. supra note 7, at 124-32.
14. Id. at 139.

21 (1959).
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One example of a charitable trust which has been serving a
useful public purpose over a broad span of time has resulted from
Inglis v. Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor.5 In his will Captain
Robert Richard Randall, a Revolutionary War privateer, 16 left the
farm on which he had resided to certain trustees, directing them to
built on the land "an asylum or marine hospital to be called 'The
Sailor's Snug Harbor,' for the purpose of maintaining and supporting aged, decrepid [sic] and worn out sailors."'1 7 The income was to
support this charity perpetually. This property consisted of a large
area of lower Manhattan Island,. and today its ten square blocks, no
longer the site of the charity, are highly profitable real estate.
Occupying "a tree-shaded knoll on Staten Island," this charitable
home is still operating successfully 8 and efficiently, 9 providing a
home for 314 retired seamen, although more than a century and a
half have passed since the will was probated.2 0 Although he considers this worthwhile institution an exceptional one, even Professor Simes is forced to admit that "after 150 years, the trust purpose is neither eccentric or obsolescent, even as applied to the existing trust state."'2 ' The Sailor's Snug Harbor has proved to be a
remarkable charity indeed, and its record strengthens the policy in
favor of perpetual charitable trusts.
SUCCEssIVE Girrs
Gifts Over to Charity
If there is a gift to one charity, followed by a gift over to a
second charity upon an event which may not occur within the
22
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, the gift over is valid.
15.

28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830).

16. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1960, § 5, p. 13.
17. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 112.
18. N.Y. Times, op. cit. supra note 16.
19. "The last report of the trust indicates that the current income is
all being used for the trust purposes ... ." SnviEs, op. cit. supra note 7, at
137.
20. N.Y. Times, op. cit. supra note 16.
21. SnIES, op. cit. supra note 7, at 137.
22. Christ's Hospital v. Grainger, 16 Sim. 83, 60 Eng. Rep. 804 (1847);
aff'd, 1 Mac. & G. 460, 41 Eng. Rep. 1343 (1849); Royal College of Surgeons
v. Nat'l Provincial Bank, (1952) 2 L.R. 984 (C.A.); Jones v. Habersham,
107 U.S. 174 (1882); Colonial Trust Co. v. Waldron, 112 Conn. 216, 152
AUt. 69 (1930); Storrs Agricultural School v. Whitney, 54 Conn. 342, 8 Ati.
141 (1887); Dickerson v. City of Anna, 310 Ill. 222, 141 N.E. 754 (1923);
Herron v. Stanton, 79 Ind. App. 683, 147 N.E. 305 (1922); City of Belfast v.
Goodwill Farm, 150 Me. 17, 103 A.2d 517 (1954); Mackenzie v. Trustees of
Presbytery of Jersey City, 67 N.J. Eq. 652, 61 Ati. 1027 (Ct. Err. & App.
1905); In re Delong's Estate, 140 Misc. 92, 250 N.Y. Supp. 504 (Surr. Ct.
1931); Williams v. Williams, 215 N.C. 739, 3 S.E.2d 334 (1939); Levan's
Estate, 314 Pa. 274, 171 Atl. 617 (1934); Lennig's Estate, 154 Pa. 209, 25
Atl. 1049 (1893);

RESTATEMENT,

PROPERTY

§ 379(1)

(1944).

See Judevine

v. Judevine, 61 Vt. 587, 18 Atl. 778 (1889). Cf. Webster v. Wiggin, 19 R.I.
73, 31 Atl. 824 (1895) (gift over upheld on the unique theory that testator
intended it to operate as a cy pres disposition of the fund). See also Lehigh
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This principle, now "too well settled to require discussion"2

3

in

modern American cases, was established in the landmark case of
Christ's Hospital v. Grainger.24 In that case the testator, who died
in 1624, gave property to the Corporation of Reading in certain
trusts for the poor of the town, but if the corporation should neglect to perform those trusts or misemploy the property for one
year, then to the Corporation of London in trust for Christ's Hospital. More than two hundred years after the testator's death the
contingency occurred. It was held that the gift over was effective.2 5 Lord Cottenhan explained the result:

If the Corporation might hold the property for certain charities in Reading why may not the Corporation of London
hold it for the charity of Christ's Hospital in London? The
property
is neither more nor less alienable on that ac26
count.

in this decision, the court was obviously viewing the Rule Against
Perpetuities as a rule aimed at inalienability. The property was no
more inalienable when given to two charities in succession than
when given to one perpetually. 27 Under the modern understanding
of the rule, as a prohibition against remotely contingent interests, 2 8
if the gift over had not been for a charity, it would have been
void.2 9 More recent courts have not overruled this case even
though it was decided under the general principle preventing inalienability rather than under the Rule Against Perpetuities (reUniv. v. Hower, 159 Pa. Super. 84, 46 A.2d 516 (1946).

Although this rule of law is usually invoked where one instrument
makes two gifts to charities, it would probably also be operative when
one charity conveys to another. E.g., Charity A could convey the fee of
land it owns to charity B, reserving a perpetual option to repurchase it.
See Community of Priests of St. Basil v. Byrne, 236 S.W. 1016 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1922), rev'd on other grounds, 225 S.W. 601 (Tex. Com. App. 1923);
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 397(2) (b) (1944).
One charity, likewise, could
give another a perpetual option to purchase its property.

Id. at § 397(2)

(a). This exception to the Rule Against Perpetuities would presumably
approve a conveyance by one charity to another on a condition precedent
not certain to occur within the perpetuities period.
23. Levan's Estate, 314 Pa. 274, 276, 171 Atl. 617, 618 (1934).
24. 16 Sim. 83, 60 Eng. Rep. 804 (1847), aff'd, 1 Mac. & G. 460, 41 Eng.
Rep. 1343 (1849).

25. Although in Christ's Hospital the gift over of the legal interest was
to a new trustee of another charitable trust, it is immaterial whether on
the occurrence of the contingency the same trustees are directed to hold
the property for a different charitable purpose or whether the property is
to go directly to a charitable corporation.
26. 1 Mac. & G. at 464, 41 Eng. Rep. at 1347.
27. Simes describes this principle as "but a kind of corollary to the
rule that there may be a perpetual charitable trust." SIMES, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 114.
28. "Property dedicated to a charity is inalienable necessarily; but
to allow a gift to charity to commence in the remote future is not necessary." GRAY, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 600.
29. GRAY, Remoteness of Charitable Gifts, 7 HARV. L. REV. 406 (1894).
See cases cited note 44 infra.
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moteness of vesting). Thus, it has with time become petrified into
a rule of law which must be considered an exception to the Rule
Against Perpetuities. 30 In the United States we still find courts
approaching this kind of disposition with the same type of reasoning3 1 that was employed in Christ's Hospital. Storrs Agricultural
School v. Whitney3 2 shows the similarity:
The law favors charitable uses. It does so with knowledge
that in most cases they are intended to be practically perpetual; and it is willing to permit what of evil results from
the devotion of property to such length of use in consideration of the beneficient results flowing therefrom. As one
charitable use may be perpetual, the gift to two in succession can be of no longer duration nor of greater evil. The
property is taken out of commerce, but it instantly goes
into perpetual servitude to charity. 33
The policy in favor of charities, therefore, is so strong that the gift
over to the second charity is valid even though it might become
34
effective at a remote future time.
Although the holding in Christ's Hospital was favorable to
charity, unfortunately it has been successfully manipulated for less
worthwhile purposes. In England a gift or trust for the perpetual
repair of a grave was invalid. A private grave is not of sufficient
public benefit to be a charity. Such a gift therefore violates the
rule holding "honorary trusts" void unless restricted to the perpetuities period. 35 Respect for the dead, however, makes the upkeep of graves a desirable objective. A perpetual endowment, as
compared with the difficulties of annual financing by scattered
descedants, is the more certain and efficient method. In the United
States, decisions disallowing such endowments have often been followed by statutes validating them. It is not surprising that courts
36
bound by such a rule should attempt to escape it. In In re Tyler,
a gift for perpetual upkeep of a grave was made operative by in30. This principle has sometimes been less appropriately explained
by saying that the property is vested in charity in general. See Brigham
v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 134 Fed. 513, 519 (1st Cir. 1904) ("equitable interests were vested from the time of the decease of the testator.")
31. Some courts completely dispense with any analysis. See Levan's
Estate, 314 Pa. 274, 276, 171 Atl. 617, 618 (1934).
32. 54 Conn. 342, 8 Atl. 141 (1887).
33. Id. at 345, 8 Atl. at 143.

34. It has been argued that such a provision might have an inhibitory
effect upon the first charity. For example, "Property is devised to a university to establish a medical school. It will greatly diminish the motives
to establish and conduct such a school, to found professorships and build
laboratories, if all the money necessary to pay professors and maintain
laboratories is to be taken from the university on a contingency, especially

on a contingency over which it may have no control."

GRAY, Op.

cit. supra

note 4, at § 603.7. This argument would also apply to a gift over to an
individual or non-charity following a gift for a charitable purpose.
35. See 2 ScoTT, Tnusrs § 124.2 (2d 1956).
36. (1891) 3 Ch. 252.
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geniously employing the principle of Christ's Hospital v. Grainger
to do indirectly what could not be done directly. In re Tyler
concerned a bequest to the trustees of the London Missionary Society. The testator committed to the trustees the keys of his family
vault with the "request" that they keep the vault in good repair,
and if they should fail to comply the money was to go to the Blue
Coat School. Feeling bound by Christ's Hospital the court held the
gift over valid on the ground that there was nothing to show that
funds for the care of the vault would not be obtained elsewhere
and that no part of the bequest would be used for that purpose.
Although the testator's scheme required quite a bit more money
than would have been necessary simply to maintain a grave, the
income from this fund would induce the charity to carry out his
wishes.
The importance of carefully drafting such a plan was indicated
by In re Dalziel.37 The testator gave money to a hospital on the
condition that as much income as necessary should be used to maintain and rebuild a mausoleum costing more than the bequest, with a
gift over to various other charities on failure to comply with the
direction. Because the testator tried to alter the method of Tyler
by requiring the hospital to use the actual income from the bequest
for the upkeep of the mausoleum, a non-charitable purpose, Tyler
was not followed and the gift over was held void.
In re Lopes, 3s however, successfully broadened the Tyler device. Testator's bequest to the Zoological Society of London was
conditioned on the Society keeping certain graves in repair and
hanging his mother's portrait in the Society's board room. On
failure to comply, the property was given to St. Barthalomew's
Hospital. The validity of the gift over was uncontested by counsel and unquestioned by the court.
In Christ's Hospital v. Grainger and, except those mentioned
above, in the modern cases following it, 39 the contingency upon
which the property shifted "from the first charity to the second
[was] an event relevant to the fulfillment of the charitable purpose. '40 In such circumstances no great evil results. "The testator
is simply being allowed to exert an unusual degree and duration of
control over property which is fully devoted to charitable purposes.
37. (1943) Ch. 277, noted in 8 CoNvEY. (N.S.)
REv. 26 (1944).
38. (1931) 2 Ch. 130.

166 (1944); 60 L. Q.

39. E.g., Royal College of Surgeons v. Nat'l Provincial Bank, (1952)
2 L.R. 984 (C.A.). Testator directed certain moneys to be paid yearly to
the Middlesex Hospital for the maintenance of the institute of pathology,
but "should the Middlesex Hospital become nationalized," as it did soon
after testator's death, then to the Royal College of Surgeons. The gift over
was held valid. The contingency on which the second gift became operative
was obviously an event which pertained to accomplishing the charitable
objective: if a charity becomes nationalized it is no longer a charity; the
property should pass to a new charity.
40. MoRRis & LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 187 (1956).
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The question is one of policy, of balancing conflicting interests. '41
The policy in favor of timely vesting is outweighed by the policy in
favor of perpetual gifts for charities. It then becomes a fairly
easy step to sustain a gift over to a second charity on an event connected with administering the previous one.
Tyler, however, established the principle that the condition
causing the shift between charities could be one not relevant to the
fulfillment of a charitable purpose. Moreover, the whole disposition was a subterfuge whereby the condition designated by the
testator could accomplish a non-charitable purpose. Although the
Tyler situation has yet to arise in an American jurisdiction, if it
would be held valid here,4 2 it would be difficult to distinguish from
the following hypothetical gift:
Testator gives to the trustees of a hospital certain valuable
urban real estate on the condition, however, that if the
hospital shall ever fail to pay annually the sum of $2,000 to
such person as shall on the first day of each year be testator's oldest living lineal descedant, then to another hospital.
The question is, should a testator be able in this way to create a
perpetual condition which substantially benefits his descedants,
when otherwise, if the condition did not move a gift of property
between two charities, such a provision would be void as contrary to
the basic policies of the Rule Against Perpetuities? If so, should
the validity of the gift over depend upon the nature of the condition?
It is submitted that the wisest rule for these cases should be a
flexible one. Generally, when a remote condition precedent totally
unrelated to any charitable purpose would move the gift from one
charity to another, the gift over should be held void. 43 But room
should be left for escape. The relative desirability, importance or
ease of accomplishment of the private condition should be compared
to the charitable use. If the former does compare favorably it
should be validated. Admittedly this is a slippery concept. If,
for example, maintaining a grave should be found to be desirable
and important, such a requirement would not unduly burden a
charitable institution. Then, too, a direction to hang a portrait
would be easy to obey. A requirement to pay 2,000 dollars a year
to testators' oldest living lineal descedant, however, is neither desirable, important or effortlessly followed. Under the proposed
41. Ibid.
42. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 397, comment d (1944), would go even
further than Tyler. It says a gift that might shift between charities would

be totally valid "even when the retention of ownership by the first charity
necessarily involves, in effect, a diversion of part of the subject-matter of
the gift to a non-charitable objective."
43. Gray suggests confining the validity of the condition to cases in
which it concerns the conduct of the charitable trust. The trustee should
have some control over the contingency upon which the charity will be
divested. GRAY, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 603.81, n.l.
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rule, such objectionable conditions would be made inoperative by
holding the gift over void. As a further reply to the objection that
the suggested criterion is too vague, it can be said that gifts of this
type are infrequent and unpredictable. A flexible rule such as is
needed would be relatively harmless because these gifts are few.
The result would be to observe the testator's wishes, but never to
the point of obviating the policy of favoring charities.
Gifts Over to Non-Charity
If a future interest for a charity, preceded by a present interest
for a charity, is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, it
might also be thought that a future interest for a non-charitable
purpose or for an individual, preceded by a present interest for a
charitable purpose, would also be outside the rule. Such is not the
case, because the gift over to a charity situation is an exception to
the Rule Against Perpetuities while the gift over to a non-charity
falls squarely within its doctrine. If a gift is made to a charity
with a condition that on a specified event, not certain to happen
within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, the property
will go by way of executory limitation to a non-charity or an individual, the gift is void. 44 The leading case here is Proprietorsof
Church in Brattle Square v. Grant,45 wherein the testatrix's gift,
as construed by the court, was "my house to the church forever,
but if its minister shall not constantly reside in said house, then to
John Hancock and his heirs." The executory devise was held invalid, and the church, which formerly had a fee simple
on condition
4
subsequent, now owned the property in fee simple.
The courts invalidate these gifts over because they are not
gifts to charity and thus should not be favored with an exception to
the Rule Against Perpetuities. In voiding a divesting gift to an
individual which follows a bequest for a charitable purpose, the
courts are being consistent in their policy of favoring charities.
By invoking the Rule Against Perpetuities the courts can ignore the
following argument which might be raised in favor of the execu44. In re DaCosta, (1912)

1 Ch. 337; McMahon v. Consistory of St.

Paul's Reformed Church, 196 Md. 125, 75 A.2d 122 (1950); Starr v. Min-

isters & Trustees of Starr Methodist Protestant Church, 112 Md. 171, 76
Atl. 595 (1910); Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91
N.E.2d 922 (1950); First Universalist Soc'y v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29

N.E. 524 (1892); Society for Promoting Theological Educ. v. Attorney Gen-

eral, 135 Mass. (39 Lathroup) 285 (1883); Wells v. Heath, 76 Mass. (10
Gray) 17 (1857); Proprieters of Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 69
Mass. (3 Gray) 142 (1855); Rolfe & Rumford Asylum v. Lefebre, 69 N.H.
238, 45 Atl. 1087 (1897); Palmer v. Union Bank, 17 R.I. 627, 24 Atl. 109
(1892); Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36 (1925); In re
Pruner's Estate, 400 Pa. 629, 162 A.2d 626 (1960), noted in 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 433 (1961).
45. 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 142 (1855).
46. See First Universalist Soc'y v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E.
524 (1892) (executory interest after a base fee held void, nevertheless a

valid possibility of reverter remained in the grantor or his heirs).
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tory interest: (1) a purpose of the Rule Against Perpetuities is to
prevent property from being removed from commerce, (2) but the
prior gift to charity has taken the property out of commerce, so
(3) the gift over to an individual could not remove it any more-in
fact, it would be more likely to return to commerce. This argument
omits the more fundamental reasons for the Rule Against Perpetuities, curtailment of dead hand control and elimination of impediments to marketability of property, which both point to a different result.
Gifts Over to Charity After Gifts to Non-Charities
The result is the same if the last-mentioned situation is reversed. That is, if a gift is made to an individual or noncharity and
47
then over to a charity on a remote contingency, the gift over fails.
For example, in Institution for Savings v. Roxbury Home for Aged
Women, 48 a gift of real estate was made to a savings bank "as long
as the present institution shall continue to exist," with a direction
that the property should pass to a home for aged women if and
when the bank should go out of existence.
The gift over was held
49
void because the bank was not a charity.
Obviously in dispositions like this, if the gift over were valid
it would be a boon for charities. As the law stands, however, the
property most likely will never benefit a charitable institution.
Would it be possible and would it be wise for courts to favor charities by making a future interest for a charitable purpose which follows a private present interest exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities?
As a matter of logical consistency, the future interest in a charity which follows a present non-charitable gift is no more offensive
because of remoteness of vesting than is the future charitable interest which follows a present charitable gift. The exception to the
Rule Against Perpetuities which applies in the latter case could
control the former as well. If such a future interest in a charity
would be valid, it might induce more charitable giving. An individual would be attracted by the opportunity to exercise his will
over a longer period of time in the disposition of his property. He
would only gain this privilege through the worthwhile "expense"
of devoting his wealth to a public purpose. How important in this
47. Merritt v. Bucknam, 77 Me. 253 (1855); Talbot v. Riggs, 287 Mass.
144, 191 N.E. 360 (1934); Institution for Savings v. Roxbury Home for Aged
Women, 244 Mass. 583, 139 N.E. 301 (1923); Leonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y. 96
(1858); In re Penrose Estate, 257 Pa. 231, 101 Atl. 319 (1917); Clairborne
v. Wilson, 168 Va. 469, 192 S.E. 585 (1937).
48. 244 Mass. 583, 139 N.E. 301 (1923).
49. The same result occurs if the present interest is in an individual.
In Leonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y. 96 (1858), testator devised land to his nephew
"until Gloversville shall be incorporated as a village," and then to Glovers-

ville for the purpose of establishing a library.
was invalid.

The gift to Gloversville
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case, then, are the two main reasons for the Rule Against Perpetuities? Is it necessary here to concern ourselves with eliminating
impediments to the marketability of property or curtailing dead
hand control?
Marketability is the lesser consideration. True, when land not
held in trust is involved, the existence of a future interest would
restrict the property's use. Those in possession might not be able
to employ it to its best effectiveness or sell it. When a future
interest is created in property today, however, it is usually given in
trust, and trustees commonly have the power of sale. For example,
property is given in trust, with income to A for life, then to A's
children (who may be after-born and who may live for 60 years),
and then to charity X. Because the income rights are certain to
vest in the beneficiaries in time and the gift of the principal would
be a vested remainder, the trust is valid, even though it may last
longer than the period of the rule. The trustee can sell and reinvest the property and so no difficulty regarding marketability
arises.
The Rule Against Perpetuities, however, is a two-edged sword.
Although a gift might escape the thrust of marketability, it must
still encounter the problem of dead hand control. It is true that
if remote gifts to charities were valid, property would not be tied up
indefinitely in one family, but would ultimately be spent on charity for the public. The problem, however, is that a prior gift might
be made to a private trust which would hold the property for an
unduly long time, thus making the gift over to the charity contingent on an event in the distant future. This charity would be one
chosen by the testator. Such a result is precisely what is meant by
the need to curtail dead hand control. The gift over to the charity
would be void. A man ought not to be able to dictate that his
property should be held for a private use and then, on occurrence of
a specified event, delivered to a charity of his choosing. The policy
against dead hand control would be especially strong in this instance because charities are involved. It seems highly unlikely
that a testator will choose what will be the best, the most needed
charity when his gift finally takes effect many years later. The
charity which he does choose may go out of date before the gift to
it is effective. 50 "The dead hand controls until it has been dead too
long." 51
The conclusion is evident. It would be unwise to permit a remote gift to a charity which follows a present interest in a noncharity. The theories behind the Rule Against Perpetuities greatly
outweigh the desire to favor charities. No changes can or should
be made.
50. See supra note 10.
51. GULLIVER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 15.

These arguments against

dead hand domination would also be valid against a Christ's Hospital dis-

position.
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CHARITABLE GIFTS UPON CONDITION PRECEDENT

When a gift is made to a charity, not preceded by a limitation
to a charity, and a court construes the gift as being subject to a
condition precedent which is not certain to happen within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, the gift is void. 52 Sometimes
the limitation is clearly conditional. An annuity is bequeathed to
the Central London Rangers on the appointment of the next lieutenant-colonel. 53 Property is given to the trustees or managing
body of the first public hospital which is thereafter established in a
particular town to defray its building expenses. 54 Funds are made
available for a charitable purpose, but only when a representative
individual or organization 6 of a particular group applies for them.
Or a gift over to a charity is made after indefinite failure of an
individual's issue.57 In all of these dispositions the condition might
not have occurred within the required period and the courts had no
trouble invalidating them. 5s
In many cases, however, the time of vesting in the charity is

52. In re Mander, (1950) Ch. 547; In re Lord Stratheden and Campbell, (1894) 3 Ch. 265, noted in 29 YALE L.J. 46 (1919); Girard Trust Co.
v. Russell, 179 Fed. 446 (3d Cir. 1910); Jocelyn v. Nott, 44 Conn. 55 (1876);
Easton v. Hall, 323 Ill. 397, 154 N.E. 216 (1926), noted in 40 HARV. L. REV.
913 (1927); Malmquist v. Detar, 123 Kan. 384, 255 Pac. 42 (1927); Sandford's Adm'r. v. Sandford, 230 Ky. 429, 20 S.W.2d 83 (1929); Merrill v.
American Baptist Missionary Union, 73 N.H. 414, 62 Atl. 647 (1905); Coleman House, Inc. v. City of Asbury Park, 129 N.J. Eq. 399, 19 A.2d 889 (Ch.
1941); Ledwith v. Hurst, 284 Pa. 94, 130 Atl. 315 (1925); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 396 (1944). See also State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W.
548 (1898).
When a gift to a charity fails for this reason, a gift over to another
charity on a remote contingency also necessarily fails. Letcher's Trustee
v. Letcher, 302 Ky. 448, 194 S.W.2d 984 (1946).
53. In re Lord Stratheden and Campbell, supra note 52.
54. Malmquist v. Detar, 123 Kan. 384, 255 Pac. 42 (1927).
55. In re Mander, (1950) Ch. 547.
56. Jocelyn v. Nott, 44 Conn. 55 (1876).
57. Merrill v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 73 N.H. 414, 62 Atl.
647 (1905); Ledwith v. Hurst, 284 Pa. 94, 130 Atl. 315 (1925); Lockhart
Estate, 26 Pa. D.&C.2d 701 (Orphans' Ct. 1962).
58. Although almost no cases have arisen on the subject, courts would
probably have to validate every contingent gift to a charity (whether it
follows an interest in a charity or not) in those jurisdictions which have
statutes stating that no charitable gift shall be invalid because it contravenes the Rule Against Perpetuities. E.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 26.1191
(1953), wherein it is provided:
No gift, grant, bequest or devise, whether in trust or otherwise to
religious, educational, charitable or benevolent uses ...

which

shall in other respects be valid under the laws of this state, shall
be invalid by reason of .

.

. the same contravening any statute or

rule against perpetuities.
See similar statutes in VNN. STAT. ANN. § 501.12 subd. 2 (1947); N.C. GEN.
Because of the plain language of the statutes no
STAT. § 36-21 (1950).
other conclusion seems likely, even though such a construction might tie
up property indefinitely awaiting an event that may never occur. Cf. In
re Brown's Estate, 198 Mich. 544, 165 N.W. 929 (1917).
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uncertain. The instructions of the disposition raise a possibility
that the property may not be applied to the charity within the required period. Counter-balancing this possibility is the strong feeling in the courts that the gift must be sustained so that the charity
can benefit. As a result, several methods of validating are employed which encompass all but the most obviously conditional
limitations.
The courts have no trouble construing a gift as vested when
action by the settlor's personal representative (usually a trustee)
is essentially all that is needed to insure that the property will be
applied to the charity. In these cases extrinsic factors are at a
minimum, whereas the integrity of the settlor's chosen representative is the key consideration regarding the timely distribution of
the property. 59 Thus, when trustees were directed in a will to
select charitable beneficiaries6" or to pay debts and legacies before
the residue of an estate would go to a charity,6 ' the trustees' actions in fulfilling these requirements were not conditions precedent
to the vesting of the estate. Likewise, when a trustee was directed
to accumulate income until the value of the corpus equalled a stated
sum and the trustee was to be "the sole judge as to value," the
trust was not held void for uncertainty as authorizing the trustee
to postpone application of the property to the charity indefinitely. 2 Even when a trustee was instructed to erect a commercial
building on land left by the testator and to give one-half of the
income from the building to charity, the gift was held vested in
charity at the testator's death. 63 Nor is the result different when
an accumulation is involved. When trustees receive the property
with directions to accumulate the income until a specified sum is
reached and then devote it to the charity named, the gift is immediate. Accumulation is not a condition precedent to vesting, but
merely a postponement of enjoyment to a later time, possibly beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 64
59. WOLFE, Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Charity, 17 IND. L.
J. 205, 219 (1942).
60. Nat'l City Bank v. Beebe, 155 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd,
3 App. Div.2d 831, 161 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1957).
See Litcher v. Trust Co., 11
N.J. 64, 93 A.2d 368 (1952).
61. Smith v. United States Nat'l Bank, 120 Colo. 167, 207 P.2d 1194
(1949), noted in 49 MICH. L. REV. 281 (1950). This type of direction would
have to be complied with as a matter of law.
62. Perkins v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 190 Ga. 29, 8 S.E.2d 28
(1940).
63. Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 134 N.E. 276 (1922).
64. Perkins v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 190 Ga. 29, 8 S.E.2d 28
(1940); Odell v. Odell, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 1 (1865); Frazier v. Merchants
Nat'l Bank, 296 Mass. 298, 5 N.E.2d 550 (1936); In re Galland's Estate, 103
Wash. 106, 173 Pac. 740 (1918).
Contra Murphy v. Johnston, 190 Ga. 29, 8

S.E.2d 28 (1940), where the court found that the accumulation would last
for approximately 200 years.
A similar gift for a non-charitable purpose would be void as attempting to create an executory interest that would not necessarily become pos-
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Most often, however, a testator desires that his property should
go to a charitable institution, usually a corporation, to be formed
and managed by his executors or trustees. He therefore instructs
his personal representatives to establish the institution 5 or to procure incorporation66 and then to pay over his property to the charity. Many times the testator requires a period of accumulation,
which may or may not last longer than the perpetuities period,
before the corporation is formed or receives the fund. 67 Against
the objection that the corporation might not be formed or the institution established within the required period, the courts have
held these gifts vested.6 8
Greater problems arise for the courts when they are called
upon to construe gifts in which extrinsic factors exist. In these
cases there is commonly a condition that some kind of action must
be done by a third party not the testator's personal representative,
or that some entirely fortuitous event must occur. 69 Thus, property is donated to a city on the condition that it takes certain steps
before it can receive the gift; 70 personalty is bequeathed to the
sessory within the period. The abstract concept of a present vesting in
charity would not be available there.
65. Kingdom v. Record, 58 Ohio Op. 407, 133 N.E.2d 921 (P. Ct. 1954).
66. Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99
(1830); Crerer v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 34 N.E. 467 (1893); In re Juillard's
Will, 238 N.Y. 499, 144 N.E. 772 (1924); In re Potts' Will, 205 App. Div. 147,
199 N.Y.S. 880 (1923), aff'd, 236 N.Y. 658, 142 N.E. 323 (1923), noted in 37
HARV. L. REV. 275 (1923).
67. Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 134 Fed. 513 (1st Cir.
1904); Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 Ill. 432, 48 N.E. 561 (1897); Codman v.
Brigham, 187 Mass. 309, 72 N.E.2d 1008 (1909); Conway v. Third Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 61, 177 Atl. 113 (Ch. 1935), modified, 119
N.J. Eq. 575, 182 Atl. 916 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936). See Massachusetts Institution of Technology v. Attorney General, 235 Mass. 288, 126 N.E. 521
(1920).
68. But see First Camden Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.Collins, 144 N.J.
Eq. 59, 168 Atl. 275 (Ct.Err. & App. 1933), noted in 31 MICH. L. REV. 1167
(1933), 43 YALE L. J. 334 (1933), 20 VA. L. REV. 365 (1934). The court
held the gift void because of special circumstances. Testator gave his
residuary estate in trust to accumulate until 21 years after the death of
the survivor of six named young children. Thereafter the trustees were
to form a corporation to receive the accumulated fund and apply the property to the erection and establishment of a school. Probably because the
testator chose not to have his property employed for charitable purposes

until the extreme end of the lawful perpetuities period and because he cut
off his widow and children with a pittance, the court held the attempted
disposition invalid, saying specifically that the hiatus between the end of
the lawful period and the organization of the corporation was fatal to the
trust.
69. Cf. In re Lenning's Estate, 154 Pa. 209, 25 Atl. 1049 (1893).
70. Franklin v. Hastings, 253 Ill. 46, 97 N.E. 265 (1912); Bell v.
Nesmith, 217 Mass. 254, 104 N.E. 72 (1914); Bullard v. Village of Albion,
217 N.Y.S. 849, 128 Misc. 292 (Sup. Ct. 1926). See Colonial Trust Co. v.
Waldron, 112 Conn. 216, 152 Atl. 69 (1930).

Summer 1966]

CHARITABLE GIVING

first public hospital 7' or to the first orphan's home 72 built in a
town; or a gift is made for a charitable purpose provided that
property is also given by someone else. 73 Usually in this type of
case the property may not be employed toward charitable purpose
75
4
for a long time, if ever.
To sustain such gifts against various attacks, the courts have
utilized several theories. In some cases particular instructions by
a testator are said to create no problems regarding vesting because
they are merely matters of administration 76 or refer only to the
manner of enjoying the property.77 Similarly, the court may find
that the condition relates not to vesting, but simply to the time
78
of enjoyment.
Several courts have found that, at the effective date of the dispositive instrument, the trustees held a sufficiently vested interest.7 9 Gould v. Taylor Orphan Asylum80 was an unusual case because the court did more than simply state that the gift vested in
the trustees. Property was given to trustees to construct an orphan asylum. The corpus was to be paid over to the institution
when incorporated, which it soon was. The court ruled that the
orphan's home held valid title because the funds went directly to
the trustees and because failure of incorporation would not have
ended the trust, as the trustees or their successors would still have
had power to administer the charity. Thus the incorporated char71.
72.

Malmquist v. Detar, 123 Kan. 384, 255 Pac. 42 (1927).
Re Schjaastad Estate, 50 D.L.R. 445 (Sask. 1919), noted in 33
HARV. L. REV. 986 (1920).
73. Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 26 Atl. 846 (1893); Community
Unit School Dist. Number 4 v. Booth, 1 Ill.2d 545, 116 N.E.2d 161 (1953).
74. Girard Trust Co. v. Russell, 179 Fed. 446 (3d Cir. 1910) (provision to accumulate $2,000 until it should equal the state debt which it
should then pay off, held to be a condition precedent to vesting of the gift
in charity).
75. E.g., Hanges v. Zander, 314 Ill. 170, 145 N.E. 363 (1924) (testator
left a sum in trust with the direction to pay out $500 to each church in
Chicago of a particular denomination which is building or thereafter builds
a church edifice).
76. Tumlin v. Troy Bank & Trust Co., 258 Ala. 238, 61 So.2d 817
(1950), noted in 39 VA. L. REV. 528 (1953); Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind.
642, 134 N.E. 276 (1922); Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 Ill. 432, 48 N.E. 561
(1897); Nat'l City Bank v. Beebe, 155 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd,
3 App. Div.2d 831, 161 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1957).
77. E.g., Franklin v. Hastings, 253 Ill. 46, 97 N.E. 265 (1912).
78. Ibid.; Wendell v. Hazel Wood Cemetery, 7 N.J. Super. 117, 72 A.2d
383 (App. Div. 1950); Community Unit School Dist. Number 4 v. Booth, 1
Ill.2d 545, 116 N.E.2d 161 (1953); Thomas v. Bryant, 185 Va. 845, 40 S.E.2d
487 (1946).
79. Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 26 Atl. 846 (1893); Ould v.
Washington Hospital for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303 (1897) (vested in trustees,
subject only to a "conditional limitation"). But see Jocelyn v. Nott, 44
Conn. 55 (1876) (vested only in trustees and not in party intended to be
benefited).
80. 46 Wis. 106, 50 N.W. 422 (1879).
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ity was said to "take title, not by will, but by transfer from the
trustee."8 1
A closely allied, but more fictional device, is to hold that the2
interest has vested in the public to be benefited by the charity.
In Kingdom v. Record83 testator left his residuary estate to a trustee
for the purpose of establishing an industrial school. Discarding the
contention that the gift violated the Rule Against Perpetuities because the school itself was the beneficiary and it might not come into
existence within the required period, the court said:
The school building or the school corporation as a separate
entity was not the real beneficiary. This is a charitable
trust for educating the young as a class, indefinite, of
course, as is usual with charitable trusts, among whom the
trustee may select individuals. The building and the school
corporation are merely means to an end. The beneficial
8 4
interest in the class vested at the death of the testator.
In one case8 5 the court employed this rationale even though, as
applied to the facts, it was illogical. A testator directed that
twenty years after his death his trustees should cause to be formed
an educational association which would use an accumulated fund to
erect schools. The majority of the court held that under the will
an interest did vest in unborn school children.
Although courts often scrutinize a gift to discover an intention
to make an immediate, unconditional donation to charity,8 6 they
often look only for a general charitable intention so that the disposition can be sustained on the cy pres theory. Cy pres is usually
found in those cases in which executors or trustees are to organize
a charitable corporation.8 7 "[TIhe cy pres doctrine of liberal construction will cause courts to be keen to discover whether the main
purpose is charity. 88s Once a general charitable intention is found
in the gift, equity takes over. Against the contention that the
Rule Against Perpetuities is violated because there is no certainty
that the charity will be incorporated within the perpetuities pe81. Id. at 117, 50 N.W. at 423.
82. Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 134 Fed. 513 (lst Cir.
1904); Tumlin v. Troy Bank & Trust Co., 258 Ala. 238, 61 So.2d 817 (1950);

Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 34 N.E. 467 (1893); Franklin v. Hastings,
253 Ill. 46, 97 N.E. 265 (1912); Harges v. Zander, 314 Ill. 170, 145 N.E. 363
(1924); Kingdom v. Record, 58 Ohio Op. 407, 133 N.E.2d 921 (P. Ct. 1954).

83. 58 Ohio Op. 407, 133 N.E.2d 921 (P. Ct. 1954).
84. Id. at 410, 133 N.E.2d at 924.
85.

(1950).

Tumlin v. Troy Bank & Trust Co., 258 Ala. 238, 61 So.2d 817

86. Ould v. Washington Hospital for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303 (1897);
Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 Ill. 432, 48 N.E. 561 (1897); Thomas v. Bryant,
185 Va. 845, 40 S.E.2d 487 (1946). Contra Girard Trust Co. v. Russel, 179

Fed. 446 (3d Cir. 1910).
87. Cummings v. Trustees of Reid Memorial Church, 64 Ga. 105
(1879).
88. Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. App. 642, 652, 134 N.E. 276, 280
(1922).
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riod, the gift is validated. The court has the power, if needed, to
utilize a different means of accomplishing the charitable purpose.
Thus, "if the mode pointed out in the conveyance or will for carrying
[the charity] into effect fails, [equity] will provide another mode
by which the charity may take effect."' 9 The manner in which the
testator wanted his gift to become operative is considered as only
one way of effectuating the general charitable purpose. The court
can thus authorize the executors or trustees to carry out the testator's wishes in a similar way so long as they fulfill his general
charitable intention. Furthermore, equity has power to appoint
.substitute trustees, if necessary, in order to sustain a gift.90 The
Rule Against Perpetuities is applicable in these instances, but its
force is blunted by the power of the court to circumvent it through
cy pres.9 1 If cy pres is not recognized by a court in a jurisdiction,
however, a similar result may be accomplished under a different
title. 2 In the case of a corporation to be formed, it may3 be held
that the charity would be formed within a reasonable time.
More careful drafting would alleviate many of the problems
courts have in struggling to hold that a gift is vested in a charitable
purpose. 94 Nonetheless, ambiguities do exist, and it is submitted
that rather than work with varied methods courts should concentrate on the cy pres doctrine. Cy pres has not been used in this
area as much as it might be. This particular application of it has
rarely been clearly explicated in the opinions, thus leading to some
disagreement as to its real meaning.9 5 If applied with judicial discretion, cy pres could enable the courts to achieve consistently
liberal results. For example, a testator writes in his will, "recog89. Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 652, 34 N.E. 467, 473 (1893).
90. In re Tower's Estate, 147 Misc. 773, 266 N.Y.S. 43 (Sup. Ct. 1933),
aff'd, 240 App. Div. 804, 266 N.Y.S. 995 (1933), noted in 43 YALE L. J. 334
(1933); Gould v. Taylor Orphan Asylum, 46 Wis. 106, 50 N.W. 422 (1879);
Burlington County Trust Co. v. New Jersey SPCA, 12 N.J. Super. 369, 79
A.2d 710 (Ch. 1951). See Pennoyer v. Wadham, 20 Ore. 274, 25 Pac. 720
(1891). Contra, Malmquist v. Detar, 123 Kan. 384, 255 Pac. 42 (1927).
91. In addition to the ordinary application of cy pres to charitable
gifts, there is a trend toward applying cy pres even to non-charitable gifts
which would otherwise violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Since 1960
in New York there has been a statutory presumption that the donor intended certain conditional events to occur within twenty-one years from
the effective date of the instrument. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 11-b 4 (1960).
92. Tumlin v. Troy Bank & Trust Co., 258 Ala. 238, 61 So.2d 817
(1950) ("equitable approximation").
93. Graff v. Wallace, 32 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
94. The draftsmen should make certain that the charitable use must
begin within the perpetuities period. E.g., "Such incorporation to be procured not later than 21 years after the death of the survivor of X, Y, and
Z." GULLIVER, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS 512 (1959).
95. It has been contended that the cy pres doctrine is necessarily

linked with the vesting of the equitable interest in the public. WOLFE,
Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Charity, 17 IND. L. J. 205 at 219-20
(1942). The Restatement makes no mention of this. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 399, comment o (1959).
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nizing the desperate need for a small hospital in the Town of X and
wishing to effectuate that purpose, I give $500,000 in trust to A, B
and C to be used for the erection of such a building on suitable
land donated by the City Council." If a court found that city
council could not or would not provide the land, nevertheless the
gift could be held valid. The court would find that the testator's
general intention was to establish this kind of charity, and that
donation of land by the city was not such a vital part of his plans
as to thwart the fulfillment of his general intention. Therefore, a
portion of his gift could be used to purchase land.
Cy pres should move into those areas in which the courts have
groped for a suitable theory. It is not a new concept, yet it is sufficiently flexible to be used in the broad spectrum of problems of
vesting, a half-lit area where the courts are eager to favor charities.
ACCUMULATIONS

Many testators choose to have their estate placed in trust and
direct that the income be added to the corpus to accumulate a fund
for a charitable purpose. Sometimes the settlor directs that all of
the income be accumulated for a length of time before the charity
can use and enjoy the trust fund.9 6 He may direct that only a
part be accumulated and allow the charity to have the balance
immediately.9 7 The question, therefore, is raised: how much accumulation should a court allow when its alternative is to give the
property directly to a charity? 9
Most of the modern concern over the evils of accumulating income stems directly from a famous English case, Thellusson v.
Woodford,9 9 which sustained a provision for long accumulation. It
has been said that, had it not been for the Thellusson case, legislation and cases concerning accumulation would never have been
written. Besides the obvious fact that the Thellusson opinion
quickly stirred legislation from Parliament, there is much that can
be said for that decision. What real harm is there in accumulation? If immediate dependents are not cut off, 100 who should care
96. Duggan v. Slocum, 92 Fed. 806 (2d Cir. 1899); Frazier v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 296 Mass. 298, 5 N.E.2d 550 (1936); Penick v. Bank of
Wadesboro, 218 N.C. 686, 12 S.E.2d 253 (1940).
97. Lyme High School Ass'n v. Alling, 113 Conn. 200, 154 Atl. 439
(1931); Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 134 N.E. 276 (1922); Quinn v.
Peoples Trust & Savings Co., 223 Ind. 317; 60 N.E.2d 281 (1945); Oldfield
v. Attorney General, 219 Mass. 378, 106 N.E. 1015 (1914); Dexter v. Harvard College, 176 Mass. 192, 57 N.E. 371 (1900); Conway v. Third Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 61, 177 Atl. 113 (Ch. 1935), aff'd, 119 N.J.
Eq. 575, 182 Atl. 916 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936); Allaun v. First & Merchants
Nat'l Bank, 190 Va. 104, 56 S.E.2d 83 (1949).
98. See GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 678 (4th ed. 1942).
99. 4 Ves. Jr. 227, Eng. Rep. (Ch. 1798); 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep.
1030 (House of Lords 1805).
100. If dependents are cut off, a statute may provide the remedy. See,
e.g., N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 17 (1949).
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about a lengthy accumulation? In Gertman v. Burdick'0 an American court extensively discussed the policy objections that could be
made and discarded them all. Answering the argument that
accumulation ties up too much wealth, the court, noting that the
trust directed the income to be reinvested (a common provision),
said:
This trust estate is no Fort Knox. We are not prepared to
say how much better or worse is the use of this money by a
trustee to buy 10 a2 security than by an heir or beneficiary to
buy a topcoat.
This brings us to the basic question. Should a direction to
accumulate for a time longer than the perpetuities period be valid if
joined with a charitable trust? It has been suggested that:
On the one hand it may be said that a vested gift to a charity which cannot be used for a period longer than lives in
being and 21 years is about as objectionable as a contingent
gift to a charity which may not vest for the same length of
time. Since the latter is void under the rule against perbe argued that the former is equally obpetuities, it 1might
03

jectionable.

Gertman would dispute this, and the courts also disagree. In
states without accumulation statutes 0 4 once a charitable trust is
considered vested, a "reasonable" provision is valid and becomes
operative, 105 even though the accumulation may last for an extended 10 6 or even indefinite 0 7 duration. It is obviously irrelevant,
101.
102.

123 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 824 (1942).
123 F.2d 924 at 933.

103.

3 SiEs & SMITH, THE LAW

OF

FuTurE INTEESTS, § 1467 (2d ed.

1956).
104. Some states with accumulation legislation have specific provisions regarding charities. But in the absence of such a specific exception
it is questionable whether the courts would consider a charitable accumulation as being outside a statute restricting accumulations.
105. See, e.g., Lyme High School Ass'n v. Alling, 113 Conn. 200, 154
Atl. 439 (1931); Colonial Trust Co. v. Waldron, 112 Conn. 216, 152 Atl. 69
(1930); Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 26 Atl. 846 (1893); Pattillo v.
Glenn, 150 Fla. 73, 7 So.2d 328 (1942); Ripley v. Brown, 218 Mass. 33, 105
N.E. 637 (1914); St. Paul's Church v. Attorney General, 164 Mass. 188, 41
N.E. 231 (1895); Wendell v. Hazel Wood Cemetery, 7 N.J. Super. 117, 72
A.2d 383 (App. Div. 1950); Allaun v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 190
Va. 104, 56 S.E.2d 83 (1949); Collins v. Lyon, Inc., 181 Va. 230, 24 S.E.2d
572 (1943); Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 134 Fed. 513 (1st
Cir. 1904); Duggan v. Slocum, 92 Fed. 806 (2d Cir. 1899).
106. Lyme High School Ass'n v. Alling, supra note 105 (accumulate
one-third of income for ninety-nine years, "or as long as the law allows");
Frazier v. Merchant's Nat'l Bank of Salem, 296 Mass. 298, 5 N.E.2d 550
(1936) (accumulate income from $117,000 until fund reaches $1,000,000);
Allaun v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, supra note 105 (accumulate onehalf the income for 125 years); In re Galland's Estate, 103 Wash. 106, 173
Pac. 740 (1918) (accumulate income until it reaches $50,000).
107. Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99
(1830) (accumulate until fund can support fifty sailors); Duggan v. Slocum,
92 Fed. 806 (2d Cir. 1899) (accumulate "for a term of ten years or more,"
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therefore, that the proposed accumulation may extend beyond the
perpetuities period.10 s The legal safeguard for protecting the public interest is not the Rule Against Perpetuities which is operative
at the settlor's death, but the power of the court of equity to keep a
check on the accumulation at a later time. 10 9 Thus, "in the case of
gifts to charities .. .the only limitation [is] in the power of the
court to take remedial measures should an unreasonable condition
result." 1 10 A court of equity may terminate"' or shorten the
period of accumulation. 1 2 Some opinions have suggested that
the trustee return in the future for further instructions concerning
further accumulation." 3
Several courts, however, have refused to sustain an accumulation provision for charity, finding it either improper 114 or impracat the discretion of executors); Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 26 Atl.
846 (1893) (accumulate $10,000 yearly for one hundred years or longer, in
trustees' discretion); Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 134 N.E. 276 (1922)
(accumulate one-half the income perpetually); Oldfield v. Attorney General, 219 Mass. 378, 106 N.E. 1015 (1914) (accumulate ninety-five per cent
for one hundred years, eighty per cent thereafter forever); Wendell v.
Hazel Wood Cemetery, 7 N.J. Super. 117, 72 A.2d 383 (App. Div. 1950)
(accumulation possible for unspecified period of time); Conway v. Third
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 61, 177 Atl. 113 (Ch. 1935), aff'd, 119
N.J. Eq. 575, 182 Atl. 916 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936) (accumulation of a portion
of the income for an unspecified period); Schreiner v. Cincinnati Altenheim, 61 Ohio App. 344, 22 N.E.2d 587 (1930) (accumulate one-half until
$250,000 is reached, then accumulate one-fourth perpetually).
108. The perpetuities period is relevant in the Internal Revenue Code,
which likewise employs a reasonableness test concerning charitable accumulations. In trusts created by the will of a decedent dying on or after
January 1, 1951, where the will requires accumulation of income, after the
perpetuities period has run charitable exemption will be denied in a taxable year if the amounts accumulated "are unreasonable in amount or
duration in order to carry out the charitable . . . purpose or function."

of 1954, § 504.
109. Duggan v. Slocum, 92 Fed. 806 (2d Cir. 1899); Woodruff v.
Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 26 Atl. 846 (1893); Lyme High School Ass'n v. Alling,
113 Conn. 200, 154 Atl. 439 (1931); Patillo v. Glenn, 150 Fla. 73, 7 So.2d
328 (1942); Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind. 642, 134 N.E. 276 (1922); Allaun
See
v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 190 Va. 104, 56 S.E.2d 83 (1949).
Odell v. Odell, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 1 (1865).
110. Lyme High School Ass'n v. Alling, 113 Conn. 200, 205, 154 Atl. 439,
441 (1931).
111. Waterbury Trust Co. v. Porter, 113 Conn. 206, 38 A.2d 598 (1944)
(thirty-eight years after testator's death, corpus and projected accumulations within a reasonable time found inadequate to carry out his purpose);
Wendell v. Hazel Wood Cemetery, 7 N.J. Super. 117, 72 A.2d 383 (App. Div.
1950). See Conway v. Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 61, 177
Atl. 113 (Ch. 1935), aff'd, 119 N.J. Eq. 575, 182 Atl. 916 (Ct. Err. & App.
1936).
112. Ripley v. Brown, 218 Mass. 33, 105 N.E. 637 (1914). See Odell
v. Odell, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 1 (1865).
113. Ripley v. Brown, supra note 112; St. Paul's Church v. Attorney
General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N.E. 231 (1895).
114. See Porter v. Baynard, 158 Fla. 294, 28 So.2d 890 (1946), cert.
denied sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Genau, 330 U.S. 844 (1947), noted in
INT. REV. CODE
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tical. 1 15 In one important recent case, In re James' Estate," 6 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held a direction for a charitable accumulation to be void ab initio. Testator had directed that the
residue of his estate be held in trust and at twenty-year intervals
after his death, one-half the accumulated income for the period be
added to principle and one-half paid to the Masonic Homes of
When two hundred and twenty
Elizabethtown, Pennsylvania.
years had elapsed, twenty-five per cent of the accumulated income
should be added to principal and seventy-five per cent paid to the
charity at twenty year intervals. When four hundred years had
elapsed, principal and undistributed income should all be paid to
the Masonic Homes. 1 7 It was held that the provisions for accumulation of income were unreasonable and void as being unnecessary, charitably purposeless and contrary to public policy as well
as to the testator's primary charitable intention. The court made
the income available to the beneficiary on a current basis. 1 8
A moderate accumulation of income actually can serve useful
purposes. Assume, for example, a man is charitably disposed but
his wealth, though substantial, is not sufficient at present to establish and support the charity he has in mind. If his estate is
permitted to accumulate for a reasonable period of time until it is
large enough to fulfill his charitable purpose, the public will be the
45 MICH. L. REV. 920 (1947), 14 U. Cm. L. REV. 686 (1947), 33 VA. L. REV.
529 (1947).
Testator left his property in trust, one-half the income of
which was devoted to charities and the other half accumulated for the
perpetual preservation of the fund. The disposition was held void as a
private trust created to last longer than the period of the rule. Testator's
dominant motive was not to benefit charity but to secure perpetual preservation of the trust. See also Pelton v. First Savings & Trust Co., 98
Fla. 748, 124 So. 169 (1929). Cf. Frazier v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 296 Mass.
298, 5 N.E.2d 550 (1936).
Although it sustained the accumulation provision in question, the court noted that "Quite apart from the rule against
perpetuities there are reasonable limits to a testator's right to impound
present-day wealth in the hope of being able to project his ideas into the
unknown conditions of a distant future." Id. at 301, 5 N.E.2d at 551.
115. See Green v. Parker, 92 N.IL 419, 32 A.2d 316 (1943), noted in
(trust for accumulation until sufficient to
42 MICH. L. REV. 323 (1943)
establish a charity failed for impracticality because the sum given was too
small). See also Citizens & Mfr's. Nat'l Bank v. Guilbert, 121 Conn. 520,
186 Atl. 564 (1936) (court applied cy pres to the trust because the income
was inadequate to establish a charity as testator had directed).
116. 414 Pa. 80, 199 A.2d 275 (1964), reversing 13 Fiduc. Rep. 636 (Pa.
Orphans' Ct. 1963).
117. Id. at 82-83, 199 A.2d at 276-7. The residuary trust corpus was
estimated at $52,500. Under the formula for accumulation provided in the
will, with interest compounded at three per cent the trust would grow in
400 years to a fund estimated at more than fourteen million dollars, and
with interest compounded at six per cent, the projected trust fund would
total more than nineteen billion dollars.
118. The case is particularly remarkable because the charitable accumulation provision was held void despite an exemption for charitable
accumulations in the Pennsylvania statute lhmiting accumulations of income. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.6(b) (1) (1950).
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ultimate beneficiary rather than his heirs. 119 Other useful purposes
for accumulation, perhaps only of a portion of the income, would
be to provide for the expansion of the charity to meet the increased
needs of a growing population 120 or to keep in repair a building
premises belonging to a charity. 12 1 In this regard, words spoken
some time ago by a court are still appropriate:
In the present case it might be suggested, if necessary, that
the intended accumulation was a very wise one, because we
cannot shut our eyes to the fact that the modern demands
of hospitals, as well as of education, are so extensive as to
require, in order to accomplish useful results, what
hereto122
fore would have been regarded as immense sums.
While courts have often said that charitable accumulations are
subject to control by a court of equity, only one case can be found
in which this power was actually exercised. 23 Nevertheless, the
use of equity's power to alter or end unreasonable accumulations
could be a great force benefiting charities. The main question
is,
24
It
of course, when does an accumulation become unreasonable.
would be unsatisfactory for a court to use as simple tests the length
of time that has elapsed during the accumulation or the value of
property which the trust fund holds. Even a careful balancing of
many factors would be unwarranted as too confusing and complex.
How, for instance, might judges properly weigh society's need at the
moment for a specified charity against trying to effectuate the
testator's intent together with the probable financial needs of the
charity in the future for growth or repairs to its physical property?
It is submitted, therefore, that an "unreasonable" accumulation
should be eliminated in the following manner. Once a charitable
accumulation is allowed, subject to further control by the court,
the trustees should be directed that when they consider a fund has
built up sufficient to accomplish the testator's charitable purpose,
the property should be so used, subject only to any additional fractional accumulation as is reasonably needed for the continuation
and growth of the charitable institution. Such a system would
119. See Odell v. Odell, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 1 (1865). But see Citizens & Mfr's. Nat'l Bank v. Guilbert, 121 Conn. 520, 186 Atl. 564 (1936)

(court would not allow accumulation sufficient to establish the intended
charity because it would take an indefinitely long time and there was
urgent need for existing funds).
120. Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125, 26 Atl. 846 (1893); Conway v.
Third Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 61, 177 AtI. 113 (Ch. 1935), aff'd,
119 N.J. Eq. 575, 182 Atl. 916 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936).
121. See Webb v. Webb, 34 Ill. 407, 172 N.E. 730 (1930).
122. Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 134 Fed. 513, 524 (1st
Cir. 1904).
123. Waterbury Trust Co. v. Porter, 113 Conn. 206, 38 A.2d 598 (1944).

124. The Restatement is unhelpfully vague: "When the facts affirmatively show a strong social interest in the termination of the accumulation the judicial desire to effectuate the giver's manifested intent must
yield." RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 442, commend d (1944).
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prevent an accumulation simply for accumulation's sake, yet it
would permit an unwealthy individual to satisfy his charitable
wishes by having his estate build into an adequate fund. Nor
would the man of wealth be hampered, for he could either choose to
build towards a greater goal or divide his estate into several smaller
trusts. Thus, while charitable giving would probably not decrease, charities would be favored by getting their property as soon
as practicable.
CHARITABLE GIFTS WITH POSSIBILITY OF REVERTER OR RIGHT OF ENTRY

There remains for discussion one area of future interests law
regarding charities in which subtle, careful operations by courts to
favor charities will not suffice. The law should be specifically
changed by statute. In the United States both rights of entry and
possibilities of reverter are exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities. 125 Hence a right of entry 126 attached to a gift to charity
or a possibility of reverter 127 after such a gift would be valid.
Rights of entry and possibilities of reverter are often linked
with transfers for charitable purposes. In First Universalist Soc'y
v. Boland,128 the gift, in effect, was to B Church as long as the land
is used for the purposes of B Church, then to C and his heirs. The
executory interest in C was held void for remoteness, but the
grantor's possibility of reverter was valid because it was not within
the Rule Against Perpetuities. As a result, the church held a base
fee and unmarketable title. 2 9 Here, then, is a basic inconsistency.
A fundamental purpose of the Rule Against Perpetuities is to
facilitate marketability of property. By exempting possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry from the operation of the rule, this
purpose is blocked. It is illogical, furthermore, for the executory
interest after the base fee or after a fee simple on a condition
subsequent to be void, and the possibility of reverter or right of
entry valid. It makes no difference whether a transferor or a trans125.
126.
(1929).

See 4 SCoTT, TRUSTS § 401.2 (1956).
City Nat'l Bank v. City of Bridgeport, 109 Conn. 529, 147 Atl. 181
See Austin v. Cambridgeport Parish, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 215

(1838).
127. Roberds v. Markham, 81 F. Supp. 38 (D.C.D.C. 1948); Brown v.
Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950); Jones v.
Burns, 221 Miss. 833, 74 So.2d 866 (1954); Bailey v. Eagle Mountain Tel.
Co., 202 Tenn. 195, 303 S.W.2d 726 (1957); Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 151
Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36 (1925); Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W.2d
448 (1950).
See Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342 (1897).
128. 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892).
129. For a dramatic illustration of how unmarketability of title can
affect a charity see Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645,
91 N.E.2d 922 (1950). A base fee in land was given to a church. Over the
years the area surrounding the church became highly commercalized, but

the church could not sell its land and move to a more suitable location
because its title was unmarketable. For a discussion of the case see
LEACH, Perpetuitiesin Perspective, 65 HARV. L. REv. 721, 742 (1952).
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that thread of title which makes the property unmarkferee holds
130
etable.
Although all holders of a base fee or a fee simple on a condition
subsequent are severely hampered by this aberration in future interests law, it is especially unfortunate when charities are involved
because they should, and often do, have a preferred position in the
law. Thus, general reform is needed. A good place to begin, and
one to which attention can be drawn, is in these transfers to charities. To limit the hindrance of possibilities of reverter and rights
of entry involved in transfers to charities would certainly be favorable to charities. But there would be a risk that such a measure
might cause a decrease in charitable giving. Charitable institutions
could no longer induce a donor to make gifts by assuring him the
property would revert if the charity ever fails to observe the
conditions he prescribes. Compared, however, with the burden
which unmarketability of title can impose upon an established charitable organization, this seems the lesser of two evils.
The remedy, of course, must come through legislation. Several
states, led by Massachusetts, have already limited all possibilities
of reverter and rights of entry. 131 The draftsmen of these statutes seem to have considered and accepted the principle that the
new legislation should be applicable to private gifts to charity.
The statute here submitted is patterned somewhat after its Massachusetts predecessor:
When a base, qualified, or determinable fee in land or a fee
simple in land on a condition subsequent is transferred to
an educational, religious or otherwise charitable institution
or organization, such an interest shall become a fee simple
absolute if the specified contingency does not occur within
thirty years from the date when such base, qualified, or determinable fee or such fee simple on a condition subsequent
becomes possessory. If such contingency occurs within
said thirty years, the possibility of reverter shall become
possessory or the right of entry exercisable notwithstanding the Rule Against Perpetuities. But when a base, qualified, or determinable fee in land or a fee simple in land on
a condition subsequent is transferred to an educational,
religious, or otherwise charitable institution or organization, if such an interest is so limited that the specified contingency must occur, if at all, within the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, said interests shall take effect as limited.
The statute would not be retroactive in deference to the attorneys
who in drafting had relied on past precedents.
A thirty-year period of limitation was chosen for the statute
instead of the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. It is felt
130. See GRAY, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 603.9 (4th ed. 1942).
131. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-97 (1960); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
160, § 29 (1954); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 184A, § 3 (1958).
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that the perpetuities period, which might easily be one hundred
years, is too long. A great deal can happen concerning land development in one hundred years. Thus, the third sentence of the
statute is included only as an optional alternative to allow those
contingencies which are certain to happen within the period of the
rule.
CONCLUSION
Both perpetuities principles and the advantageous position of
charities in the law are grounded in considerations of public policy.
Both are important in their own right, yet both must coexist. The
recommendations of this article for courts and legislatures have
been submitted in an effort to procure, deservedly, for charitable
institutions the best position possible in the law of future interests
without violating any precept of the Rule Against Perpetuities,except where one is so inconsistent as to require change.

